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A CONSTITUTIONAL TANGO OF JUDICIAL 
INTERPRETATION: THE INSTABILITY OF BANKRUPTCY 
COURT AUTHORITY UNDER ARTICLE III  
ABSTRACT 
Despite historical and modern developments, the heart of bankruptcy law 
centers around providing fresh starts to those who find themselves in severe 
financial distress. Congress created bankruptcy courts to help efficiently and 
effectively facilitate this goal. However, the complexity of debtor-creditor 
relationships necessitates that most bankruptcy proceedings hear a variety of 
claims, some of which may not arise out of the bankruptcy itself but are still 
required for bankruptcy resolution. Consequently, the authority of bankruptcy 
courts to hear all relevant claims is an essential component of bankruptcy relief. 
Article III of the United States Constitution states that judicial authority is 
vested in judges with life tenure and protected salaries. Based on opposing 
interpretations, a bankruptcy court may or may not be authorized to hear certain 
ancillary common law claims in a proceeding. A strict construction of Article III 
suggests that bankruptcy courts lack the necessary safeguards to exercise 
judicial authority. In contrast, a broad construction of Article III suggests that 
bankruptcy courts may exercise limited judicial authority in light of the practical 
benefits and minimal dangers. These two opposing canons of construction have 
shaped a volatile history of bankruptcy law.  
This Comment explores the dynamic relationship between non-Article III 
bankruptcy courts and Article III judicial authority, and how this unstable 
relationship affects the facilitation of bankruptcy goals. This Comment suggests 
a balanced four-factor approach to when the Court inevitably redraws the 
constitutional lines of bankruptcy court authority. Lending sufficient weight to 
each factor will increase the likelihood that bankruptcy procedures properly 
adapt to rapid societal growth within a constitutional framework, while 
providing more predictability in bankruptcy law development. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Financial struggle has been prevalent throughout history, and it has almost 
become a normal phase of life in today’s market.1 The real danger arises when 
those who find themselves in poor economic situations cannot prevent their 
struggles from escalating into severe financial distress.2 Anticipating this 
ubiquitous problem centuries ago, the Framers of the United States Constitution 
decided it was necessary “to establish . . . uniform laws on the subject of 
bankruptcies throughout the United States.”3 As such, Congress was 
constitutionally authorized to create federal bankruptcy laws providing debtors 
with the opportunity to “start afresh.”4 The United States Supreme Court 
illustrated that the goal of bankruptcy was to “give to the honest but unfortunate 
debtor . . . a new opportunity in life and a clear field for future efforts, 
unhampered by the pressure and discouragement of preexisting debt.”5 To 
promote these ends, Congress ultimately created bankruptcy courts to support 
the federal district courts in efficiently adjudicating bankruptcy claims.6  
Due to the complex nature of debtor-creditor relationships, the efficient 
facilitation of bankruptcy proceedings rests considerably on a bankruptcy 
court’s authority to hear a comprehensive range of claims.7 This broad authority 
is essential because bankruptcy proceedings seldom consist solely of one 
bankruptcy issue.8 Rather, these proceedings often include numerous claims that 
do not arise from the bankruptcy itself, but are still vital to the resolution of 
bankruptcy disputes.9 For example, a claim over an alleged breach of contracts 
is governed by state law, but must be resolved to determine the appropriate sum 
of valid claims against a debtor.10 Congress recognized and addressed this 
necessity through the Bankruptcy Act of 1978, which empowered bankruptcy 
courts with the statutory authority to render final judgments on claims that were 
not primary bankruptcy issues.11  
 
 1 See United States Bankruptcies, TRADINGECONOMICS.COM, http://www.tradingeconomics.com/ 
united-states/bankruptcies (last visited Oct. 20, 2016). 
 2 See id. 
 3 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
 4 Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934). 
 5 Id. 
 6 28 U.S.C. § 151 (1984).  
 7 1 Collier on Bankruptcy 3.02[2] (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed.). 
 8 See Bankruptcy Servs. v. Ernst & Young (In re CBI Holding Co.), 529 F.3d 432, 454 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 9 See id.  
 10 See generally N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982). 
 11 Bankruptcy Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978). 
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While bankruptcy courts had clear statutory authority, questions regarding 
whether bankruptcy courts had the necessary constitutional authority developed 
over time.12 The central constitutional concern was that a bankruptcy court’s 
ability to hear ancillary, non-bankruptcy claims challenged the structural 
separation of powers.13 The United States Constitution creates a government 
framework that ensures a system of checks and balances—a structure intended 
to prevent a concentration of power by dividing the government into three 
distinct branches with separate and independent authority.14 Though the intent 
was to avoid conflicts, the separation of powers generated frequent and fierce 
arguments regarding the corresponding boundaries of legislative and judicial 
authority.15  
Bankruptcy court authority is one of the many casualties of this ongoing 
separation of powers debate, “a constitutionally required game of jurisdictional 
ping-pong between courts . . . .”16 Over the last century, Supreme Court 
precedent has largely fluctuated between two opposing interpretations of a 
bankruptcy judge’s authority to render final decisions in cases and controversies 
not arising from the bankruptcy itself.17  
On one side, a strict construction18 of the Constitution suggests that it is 
unconstitutional for Congress to confer judicial authority on non-Article III 
bankruptcy judges because they do not comply with the structural safeguards of 
Article III.19 On the other side, a broad construction20 suggests that it is 
constitutional for Congress to confer judicial authority because, in light of the 
complex realities of bankruptcy law, the practical benefits considerably 
 
 12 N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. at 57. 
 13 Id. 
 14 Separation of Powers – An Overview, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, http://www. 
ncsl.org/research/about-state-legislatures/separation-of-powers-an-overview.aspx (last visited Jan. 15, 2016). 
 15 See N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. at 57. 
 16 Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 520–21 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting).  
 17 Compare Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, with Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 135 S. Ct. 1932 
(2015). 
 18 The term strict construction, or narrow construction, is defined as “interpreting the Constitution based 
on a literal and narrow definition of the language without reference to the differences in conditions when the 
Constitution was written and modern conditions, inventions and societal changes.” Strict Construction, 
LAW.COM, http://dictionary.law.com/Default.aspx?selected=2028 (last visited Feb. 16, 2017).  
 19 Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. at 503. 
 20 Broad construction, in contrast to strict construction, “looks to what someone thinks was the ‘intent’ 
of the framers’ language and expands and interprets the language extensively to meet current standards of human 
conduct and complexity of society.” Strict Construction, LAW.COM, http://dictionary.law.com/Default. 
aspx?selected=2028 (last visited Feb. 16, 2017). 
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outweigh the minimal dangers.21 Today, the exact scope of bankruptcy court 
authority still remains an important point of contention.22  
The lack of clarity in the scope of bankruptcy court authority creates residual 
uncertainty for bankruptcy procedures.23 This ambiguity is a significant problem 
because the fundamental purpose of bankruptcy proceedings is the quick and 
efficient facilitation of debtor relief and creditor repayment.24 Focus on 
promptness and efficiency is increasingly diverted to ancillary jurisdictional 
arguments, which instead lead to “inefficiency, increased cost, delay, and 
needless additional suffering among those faced with bankruptcy.”25  
In response to this developing concern, the United States Supreme Court 
provided some procedural clarity in 2015 through Wellness International 
Network Limited v. Sharif, which held that bankruptcy courts had the authority 
to render final judgments on related non-bankruptcy claims with the consent of 
the parties to the case.26 The Wellness dissent, however, characterizes the 
Court’s decision as an “impermissible [threat to] the institutional integrity of the 
Judicial Branch,”27 cautioning that an “individual may not consent away the 
institutional interest protected by the separation of powers.”28 Thus, the 
constitutional boundaries of bankruptcy court authority remain blurred. 
If history is any indication of the future, the outlook of bankruptcy court 
authority will be subject to perpetual fluctuation.29 It was only a few years ago 
when bankruptcy court authority was thoroughly limited by strict, formalistic 
interpretation.30 Subsequent narrow holdings have sidestepped certain 
procedural hurdles in bankruptcy proceedings, but the most important 
constitutional question regarding the scope of bankruptcy court authority still 
remains largely unanswered, or at least full of ambiguity. When dealing with a 
time-sensitive issue such as bankruptcy, procedural efficiency is paramount to 
those who are in financial distress and eagerly awaiting resolution. 
This Comment explores the dynamic relationship between non-Article III 
bankruptcy courts and Article III judicial authority, and how this unstable 
 
 21 Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 135 S. Ct. 1932. 
 22 See id. at 1954. 
 23 Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462. 
 24 Id. at 520–21 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 25 Id. 
 26 Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 135 S. Ct. 1932. 
 27 Id. at 1956 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 28 Id.  
 29 Compare Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, with Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 135 S. Ct. 1932. 
 30 See Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462. 
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relationship affects the facilitation of bankruptcy law. First, this Comment 
examines the historical development of bankruptcy law and how the United 
States Supreme Court has shaped bankruptcy precedent through its shifting 
interpretations of Article III. Next, this Comment addresses the developing 
concerns resulting from both the strict and broad construction of Article III 
authority as it relates to bankruptcy courts. Finally, this Comment suggests that 
when the Court, again, inevitably addresses the constitutional concerns of 
bankruptcy court authority, the Court should lend sufficient weight to the 
following four factors: (1) the current threat of encroachment, and the amount 
of protection necessary to prevent it; (2) the practical effects on bankruptcy 
proceedings, and the benefits of preserving bankruptcy law; (3) the residual 
consequences to existing non-Article III tribunals; and (4) the current trend and 
disposition of bankruptcy authority. This balanced four-factor approach can 
increase the likelihood that bankruptcy procedures adapt to rapid societal growth 
within a constitutional framework, while providing more predictability in 
bankruptcy law development. 
I. BACKGROUND 
From colonial state law debtor-creditor proceedings, to federal bankruptcy 
laws, to recent amendments of the Federal Bankruptcy Rules of Procedure, the 
only consistency in the scope of bankruptcy authority has been its inconsistency. 
Examining the evolution of debtor-creditor relations throughout the history of 
the United States provides a basic foundation for understanding how strict and 
broad construction have shaped bankruptcy law. 
A. The Establishment of Federal Bankruptcy Laws: Finding the Proper 
Balance between Debtors, Creditors, and Courts 
Until almost the twentieth century, there was no reliable federal regulation 
of bankruptcy.31 Before federal laws, the states were independently responsible 
for adjudicating bankruptcy claims but often suffered from problematic 
jurisdictional restrictions.32 Instead of relief, imprisonment was a common state 
remedy.33 Consequently, state law bankruptcy proceedings were tainted with 
volatility and regularly left debtors dwelling, or literally imprisoned, in financial 
turmoil.34 In 1787, the Framers of the Constitution believed that federal 
 
 31 DAVID A. SKEEL JR., DEBT’S DOMINION: A HISTORY OF BANKRUPTCY LAW IN AMERICA 23 (2001).  
 32 Id.  
 33 Charles Jordan Tabb, The History of Bankruptcy Laws in the United States, 3 AM. BANKR. INST. L. 
REV. 5, 12 (1995). 
 34 SKEEL, supra note 31, at 23–24.  
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legislation of bankruptcy laws was necessary to address the “problems that 
varying and discriminatory state laws caused for nonresident creditors and 
interstate commerce in general.”35 Through the Bankruptcy Clause, Congress 
was empowered to “pass uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcies.”36  
In response to repeated financial crises and commercial failures,37 Congress 
attempted to pass a set of federal bankruptcy laws in 1800.38 The Bankruptcy 
Act of 1800 was a system established for merchants which only provided for 
petitions from creditors.39 Based on early English custom, the federal 
bankruptcy laws had a “distinctly pro-creditor orientation, and was noteworthy 
for its harsh treatment of defaulting debtors.”40 Because the laws essentially 
functioned as a commercial “creditors’ remedy,” private individuals, such as 
those in agriculture, were outraged.41 Predictably, the 1800 Act was short-lived 
and eventually repealed in 1803, due to its ineffectiveness and disapproval 
among the general population.42  
It took almost forty years for Congress to implement another federal 
bankruptcy system through the Bankruptcy Act of 1841.43 Under the 1841 Act, 
voluntary bankruptcy proceedings, which were previously limited to merchants, 
became an available option for all financially troubled debtors.44 This marked 
the first time that an insolvent debtor had the option to file for bankruptcy and 
receive a discharge.45 A debtor was permitted to bring “all cases and 
controversies in bankruptcy arising between the bankrupt and any creditor” to 
the district courts for adjudication.46 However, this new set of federal bankruptcy 
laws, viewed as somewhat overly sympathetic to debtors, caused a rapid influx 
of bankruptcy filings to the district court dockets.47 Following criticism from 
 
 35 Tabb, supra note 33, at 13. 
 36 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.  
 37 The Panic of 1792 and Panic of 1797 caused widespread ruin and financial turmoil. See generally 
Robert Sylla, et. al., Alexander Hamilton, Central Banker: Crisis Management During the U.S. Financial Crisis 
of 1792, 83 BUS. HIST. REV. 61. (2009); Richard S. Chu, Certain Victims of an International Contagion: The 
Panic of 1797 and the Hard Times of the Late 1790s in Baltimore, 25 J. EARLY REP., 565 (2005).  
 38 Bankruptcy Jurisdiction in the Federal Courts, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, http://www.fjc.gov/ 
history/home.nsf/page/jurisdiction_bankruptcy.html (last visited Jan. 4, 2016).  
 39 Id.  
 40 Tabb, supra note 33, at 7. 
 41 Id. at 14–15. 
 42 Bankruptcy Jurisdiction, supra note 38.  
 43 Id.  
 44 Id. 
 45 Tabb, supra note 33, at 17. 
 46 Bankruptcy Jurisdiction, supra note 38.  
 47 Id.  
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creditors and overburdened district courts, the 1841 Act was also ultimately 
repealed.48 
Having experienced the benefits of a discharge, there was overwhelming 
support for a system of federal bankruptcy laws because state laws could not 
discharge preexisting debts.49 Congress responded in 1867 and passed a revised 
set of bankruptcy laws in which ordinary suits in law and equity related to the 
bankruptcy fell into an expanded jurisdiction for district and circuit courts.50 
With the 1867 Act, the federal courts were able to hear “plenary suits” involving 
the bankruptcy and any third parties with ancillary property disputes, even 
without a basis for federal court jurisdiction.51 The United States Supreme Court 
held this grant of jurisdiction to be constitutional because it was considered to 
be a “legitimate part of a national system of bankruptcy.”52 District judges also 
appointed several “registers in bankruptcy, to assist the judge of the district court 
in the performance of his duties.”53 Still, due to the excessive costs and lengthy 
delays of bankruptcy proceedings, the 1867 Act was eventually repealed in 
1874, proving yet again that the one constant in bankruptcy law was change.54 
Though there were several endeavors to institute a permanent and reliable 
system, most of the nineteenth century was characterized by unsuccessful 
attempts at finding the proper balance between debtors, creditors, and 
bankruptcy adjudicators.55 The 1800 Act limited bankruptcy relief to creditors 
in the commercial realm, and neglected a significant portion of private debtors 
in need of financial assistance.56 The 1841 Act opened up voluntary proceedings 
to all insolvent debtors and discharged thousands of individual debts, but it 
outraged creditors and burdened district courts with overwhelming bankruptcy 
dockets.57 The 1867 Act gave district courts original jurisdiction over 
bankruptcy and provided registers to lighten the docket, but high costs and 
delays ultimately proved fatal to effective proceedings.58 Congress could not 
find an equitable balance between debtors and creditors or an efficient means to 
resolve their bankruptcy disputes.  
 
 48 Id. 
 49 Tabb, supra note 33, at 19.  
 50 Bankruptcy Jurisdiction, supra note 38.  
 51 Id. 
 52 Id. 
 53 Tabb, supra note 33, at 19. 
 54 Bankruptcy Jurisdiction, supra note 38. 
 55 Id. 
 56 See generally Tabb, supra note 33. 
 57 Id.  
 58 Id. at 19.  
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Efforts to address the instabilities and inefficiencies of state bankruptcy law 
eventually resulted in the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, which established the modern 
concepts of debtor-creditor relations.59 The 1898 Act finally instituted federal 
bankruptcy law as a permanent regulatory system, rather than a temporary 
remedy for crisis.60 Not only did this system address debtor relief and equitable 
creditor distribution, but it focused on efficient facilitation and procedure.61 
Federal district courts were now empowered to sit as “courts of bankruptcy,” 
and appoint “referees” to conduct most of the bankruptcy proceedings.62 These 
referees handled “the bulk of the judicial and administrative work” and 
“exercised much of the jurisdiction given to the district courts.”63  
However, because state law concurrently governed many bankruptcy-related 
issues, the scope of federal court jurisdiction over bankruptcy became a source 
of controversy.64 Federal courts maintained jurisdiction of summary bankruptcy 
proceedings, but ordinary disputes of law and equity relating to the bankruptcy 
estates were predominantly left to state courts for adjudication.65 This resulted 
in immense confusion as to which cases were designated as summary 
proceedings and which cases required full and formal adjudication in state 
courts.66 Ambiguous jurisdictional problems subsequently led to increased 
litigation of jurisdictional questions rather than efficient adjudication of 
bankruptcy proceedings.67 Meanwhile, bankruptcy filings continued to 
increase.68 
In response to the obscurity in bankruptcy jurisdiction, combined with rising 
numbers of bankruptcy filings over the years, Congress initiated a complete 
reform of bankruptcy laws.69 The Bankruptcy Act of 1978 established Title 11 
of the United States Code, commonly referred to as the Bankruptcy Code (the 
Code).70 The Code ameliorated the “splintered jurisdictional scheme” of the 
1898 Act by substantially expanding bankruptcy court jurisdiction.71 
Specifically, this statute empowered bankruptcy courts to hear and decide all 
 
 59 Bankruptcy Jurisdiction, supra note 38.  
 60 Tabb, supra note 33, at 23–24. 
 61 Id, at 25. 
 62 Id.  
 63 Id.  
 64 Bankruptcy Jurisdiction, supra note 38. 
 65 Id. 
 66 Id. 
 67 Id. 
 68 Id. 
 69 28 U.S.C. § 1334 (2012). 
 70 Id. 
 71 Tabb, supra note 33, at 34. 
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civil proceedings “arising under” or “related to” Title 11.72 In the new system, 
the bankruptcy courts functioned as units under the applicable United States 
district courts, and each district court had the option to refer bankruptcy matters 
to the bankruptcy court.73  
The main objective of this extensive reform was to create a single tribunal 
to hear all bankruptcy related legal disputes and eliminate jurisdictional 
uncertainty between federal, state, and bankruptcy courts.74 While it took almost 
two centuries, the Code seemed to finally provide a “unified jurisdictional 
system” of bankruptcy that struck a proper balance between debtor relief, 
creditor repayment, and efficient adjudication.75 Instead, the Code became a 
source of constitutional controversy and increased uncertainty. Two centuries of 
modifications and adjustments culminated into a battleground for opposing 
approaches to constitutional construction and judicial interpretation. 
B. Federal Bankruptcy Law Precedent: How the United States Supreme Court 
Shaped Bankruptcy Court Authority through Constitutional Construction 
Since the establishment of the Code in 1978, Supreme Court precedent has 
mostly swayed between two opposing approaches to interpreting Article III of 
the Constitution: strict and broad construction.76 Specifically, the Court has had 
conflicting approaches to section 1 of Article III, which states:  
The judicial power of the United States, shall be vested in one Supreme 
Court, and in such inferior courts as the Congress may from time to 
time ordain and establish. The judges, both of the supreme and inferior 
courts, shall hold their offices during good behaviour, and shall, at 
stated times, receive for their services, a compensation, which shall not 
be diminished during their continuance in office.77  
A strict construction of constitutional text relies on the “literal and narrow 
definition,” without consideration of modern conditions and societal changes.78 
Thus, a strict interpretation of Article III suggests that only judges with the 
 
 72 28 U.S.C. § 1334(a) (2012).  
 73 Id. § 157.  
 74 Bankruptcy Jurisdiction, supra note 38. 
 75 Tabb, supra note 33, at 34. 
 76 Compare Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462 (2011), with Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 135 S. 
Ct. 1932 (2015). 
 77 U.S. CONST. art. 3, § 1. 
 78 Strict Construction, supra note 18. 
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proper safeguards of (1) life tenure and (2) protected salary can exercise Article 
III judicial authority.79  
In contrast, a broad construction of constitutional text looks to the Framers’ 
underlying intent, and then expands upon the text to adapt to the current needs 
of people in a rapidly changing society.80 Thus, a broad interpretation of Article 
III looks to the fundamental purpose of Article III safeguards, and then 
determines whether limited Article III authority can be properly exercised in 
particular situations that substantially address societal needs, without 
realistically threatening the intended protections.81 Starting from the institution 
of the Code to the present, Supreme Court precedent reveals that the inherent 
conflict between opposing constitutional constructions has inconsistently shaped 
bankruptcy law, and remains largely unresolved. 
1. Northern Pipeline Construction Company v. Marathon Pipe Line 
Company: Courts Lacking the Independence and Protection Provided in 
Article III Cannot Exercise Article III Judicial Authority 
In response to the Code’s expansion of bankruptcy court authority, the 
Supreme Court significantly limited bankruptcy court jurisdiction in Northern 
Pipeline Construction Company v. Marathon Pipe Line Company. In Northern 
Pipeline, a plurality determined that the Bankruptcy Act of 1978 
unconstitutionally authorized bankruptcy judges to exercise the “judicial power 
of the United States” under Article III of the Constitution.82 The plaintiff, 
Northern Pipeline Construction Co. (“Northern”), filed a petition for 
reorganization under chapter 11 of the Code in a bankruptcy court.83 In 1980, 
Northern brought suit in the same court against defendant Marathon Pipeline Co. 
(“Marathon”) for alleged breaches of contracts.84 Marathon immediately moved 
to dismiss this suit on the grounds that the Code unconstitutionally conferred 
Article III judicial authority on non-Article III judges.85  
In his plurality opinion, Justice Brennan determined that Article III judicial 
powers could not be conferred on judges who lacked life tenure and protection 
from salary reduction.86 He reasoned that when adjudicating cases, “tenure and 
 
 79 Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. at 503. 
 80 Strict Construction, supra note 18. 
 81 Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 135 S. Ct. 1932. 
 82 N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. at 62. 
 83 Id. at 56.  
 84 Id. 
 85 Id.at 56–57. 
 86 Id.at 59. 
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protection from diminution” were necessary “safeguards” to secure political 
independence from the legislative or executive branches of government.87 
However, this decision did not explicitly address the constitutionality of non-
Article III courts exercising Article III judicial authority.88 
Rather, the Court distinguished bankruptcy courts from three categories of 
exceptions in which non-Article III courts could actually exercise traditional 
judicial authority.89 First, territorial courts were exempt because Congress had 
the authority to exercise the general powers of the government in territories of 
the United States.90 Second, courts-martial, or military courts, were exempt 
because the political branches had broad constitutional authority to control the 
military.91 Third, cases involving “public rights” were exempt because these 
cases involved matters between an individual and the government, as opposed 
to private rights involving disputes between two private parties.92  
Consequently, the Court determined Congress did not have the power to vest 
bankruptcy courts with broad authority to adjudicate state law matters not 
governed by federal rules.93 Instead, Congress was only authorized to assign 
matters to non-Article III courts in situations involving federal statutes.94 Even 
then, non-Article III courts could only wield limited powers narrower than those 
of Article III courts.95 Because Northern Pipeline involved contractual rights 
subject to state law, the Court concluded that a bankruptcy court’s exercise of 
Article III judicial authority encroached upon Article III territory.96  
Writing for the dissent, Justice White emphasized that the plurality’s strict 
construction of Article III oversimplified the separation of powers analysis.97 He 
argued that examining Article III through pure textualism98 was problematic for 
two reasons.99 First, the Bankruptcy Act of 1978 was not invalid on its face, but 
 
 87 Id. at 57. 
 88 Id. at 64–71. 
 89 Id. 
 90 Id. at 64–66. 
 91 Id. at 66. 
 92 Id. at 67. 
 93 Id. at 71–74. 
 94 Id. 
 95 Id. 
 96 Id. at 71–72. 
 97 Id. at 93 (White, J. dissenting). 
 98 Textualism is a method of statutory interpretation used to determine the meaning of legislation. 
Textualism focuses on the plain text of a statute and attempts to derive objective meaning of the legal text. See 
Textualism, MERRIAM WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/textualism. (last visited Apr. 6, 
2018). 
 99 N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. at 94–95 (White, J. dissenting). 
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only invalid when narrowly applied to the Northern Pipeline case.100 Second, 
even though issues of bankruptcy, by nature, almost always involve both federal 
and state law issues, state law claims were heard too infrequently to render a 
bankruptcy court’s ability to adjudicate such claims as an intrusion on the 
separation of powers.101 Justice White’s dissent argued that the Court 
disregarded the complex realities of bankruptcy law and its applications to 
society, in favor of a rigid theory on the separation of powers.102 
The dissent further emphasized that there was no harm to the separation of 
powers because bankruptcy judges essentially assumed the role of the “referees” 
under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898.103 In fact, it was noted that under the 1978 
Act, there were even greater safeguards in place because district courts were 
given broader scope to judicially review any bankruptcy court decisions.104 
Rather than assenting to a bright line determination of matters that must appear 
before Article III courts, Justice White advocated a broad construction of Article 
III through a balancing test.105 The balancing test proposed that legislative 
encroachment should be determined by weighing the benefits of legislative 
courts against the actual dangers or effects on judicial independence.106  
Justice White ultimately asserted that the Bankruptcy Act of 1978 passed the 
balancing test for three reasons. First, bankruptcy courts were subject to 
appellate review by Article III courts.107 Second, there were no attempts from 
Congress to seize power from the Judiciary.108 Third, the Congressional goals of 
creating bankruptcy courts were worthy objectives.109 However, despite the 
dissent’s reasoning, the Northern Pipeline decision led Congress to amend the 
Bankruptcy Act in 1984.110 This amendment authorized federal courts to refer 
all bankruptcy issues to bankruptcy courts, but limited bankruptcy courts to 
submitting proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law for any “non-core” 
issues to the district courts.111  
 
 100 Id. 
 101 Id. at 96–100. 
 102 Id. at 98. 
 103 Id. 
 104 Id. at 100. 
 105 Id. at 113. 
 106 Id. at 113–15. 
 107 Id. at 116–18. 
 108 Id.  
 109 Id. at 118. 
 110 Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1983, H.R. 5174, 98th Cong. (1983). 
 111 Id. (“A bankruptcy judge may hear a proceeding that is not a core proceeding but that is otherwise 
related to a case under title 11. In such proceeding, the bankruptcy judge shall submit proposed findings of fact 
and conclusions of law to the district court, and any final order or judgment shall be entered by the district judge 
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Despite the plurality holding in Northern Pipeline, the dissent’s proposed 
balancing test would prove to be the foundation for future advocates of broad 
construction and an impediment to advocates of strict construction.112  
2. Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Schor: Administrative 
Agencies May Exercise Jurisdiction over State Law Counterclaims in 
Certain Situations 
After the Northern Pipeline decision in 1982, bankruptcy courts no longer 
had jurisdiction over “non-core” claims in bankruptcy proceedings because 
these courts lacked Article III protection.113 Any grant of broad jurisdictional 
powers to non-Article III courts was considered an encroachment on judicial 
authority.114 However, in 1986, the Supreme Court was presented with another 
constitutional issue similar to that in Northern Pipeline, but this time involving 
a different congressional act regarding the futures contracts market.115  
Specifically, the Commodity Exchange Act (CEA) prohibited fraudulent and 
manipulative conduct in connection with commodity futures transactions.116 To 
facilitate the regulatory powers of the CEA, Congress established an 
independent federal agency in 1974, called the Commodity Futures Trading 
Commission (CFTC).117 The CFTC was intended to facilitate an “‘inexpensive 
and expeditious alternative to existing fora available to aggrieved customers, 
namely, the courts and arbitration.”118 To promote these goals, the CFTC issued 
a regulation allowing its administrative law judges to adjudicate counterclaims 
“arising out of the transaction . . . or series of transactions . . . set forth in the 
complaint.”119 
In Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Schor, the Court held that an 
administrative agency’s ruling on a state law counterclaim was constitutional.120 
Here, plaintiff Schor filed a claim with the CFTC against a brokerage firm for 
 
after considering the bankruptcy judge’s proposed findings and conclusions and after reviewing de novo those 
matters to which any party has timely and specifically objected.”). 
 112 See Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462 (2011). 
 113 Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1983, H.R. 5174, 98th Cong. (1983). 
 114 See generally N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50. 
 115 See Commodity Futures Trading Com. v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833 (1986). 
 116 7 U.S.C. § 1 (2012). 
 117 See Commodity Futures Trading Com. v. Schor, 478 U.S. at 836–37. 
 118 S. REP. NO. 95-850, at 11 (1978). 
 119 Commodity Futures Trading Com. v. Schor, 478 U.S. at 837; See generally 17 C.F.R. § 12.23(b) 
(1983).  
 120 Commodity Futures Trading Com. v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833. 
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violating the CEA.121 In response, the firm filed a state law counterclaim to 
recover a debit balance in Schor’s account.122 In a CFTC proceeding, an 
administrative law judge ruled in favor of the firm on both claims.123 Schor 
subsequently challenged the CFTC’s jurisdiction to hear state law counterclaims 
and appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
Circuit. The Court of Appeals, in an attempt to avoid the same constitutional 
issue presented in Northern Pipeline, held that the CFTC only had jurisdiction 
over Schor’s claim, but not the brokerage firm’s counterclaim. After another 
appeal, the Supreme Court granted certiorari.124 
Writing for the majority opinion, Justice O’Connor applied a broad 
construction of both the CEA and Article III.125 With regards to the CEA, the 
Court held that the D.C. Circuit, in an attempt to avoid constitutional problems, 
“manufactured[d] a restriction on the CFTC’s jurisdiction that was nowhere 
contemplated by Congress and reject[ed] plain evidence of congressional intent 
because that intent was not specifically embodied in a statutory mandate.”126 
Justice O’Connor recognized that Congress created the CFTC with the purpose 
of providing “an inexpensive and expeditious alternative to existing fora 
available to aggrieved customers, namely, the courts and arbitration.”127 The 
Court acknowledged that agencies have superior knowledge to courts when 
deciding if a “particular regulation is reasonably necessary to effectuate any of 
the provisions or to accomplish any of the purposes of [an] Act the [agencies 
are] charged with enforcing” and are “therefore due substantial deference.”128 
Next, the Court applied a broad construction of Article III to determine 
whether the CFTC’s exercise of jurisdiction over state law counterclaims was 
unconstitutional.129 Justice O’Connor weighed three factors, with careful 
attention to the practical effects that such congressional action would have on 
the integrity of the Judiciary.130  
First, the Court considered the scope of judicial power reserved to Article III 
courts, in relation to the extent that an administrative agency exercised judicial 
 
 121 Id. at 837. 
 122 Id. 
 123 Id. at 838. 
 124 Id. at 838–41. 
 125 See id. at 833. 
 126 Id. at 847. 
 127 Id. at 836 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 128 Id. at 845 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 129 Id. at 847. 
 130 Id. at 851. 
KIM_COMMENT GALLEYPROOFS 6/14/2018 3:43 PM 
2018] INSTABILITY OF BANKRUPTCY COURT AUTHORITY 575 
power.131 Justice O’Connor reasoned that, notwithstanding common law 
counterclaims, the CFTC’s adjudicatory powers were in line with the 
“traditional agency model.”132 Precedent indicated that, as a practical matter, it 
was not unconstitutional for a federal agency to initially adjudicate a state law 
claim when the claim was ancillary to federal law and subject to appellate 
review.133 The Court emphasized that it was improper to declare such an exercise 
of authority as unconstitutional based on a fear of a “hypothetical slippery 
slope.”134 
Second, the Court considered the nature of the pending claim.135 In Schor, 
the counterclaim was a “private right” governed by state law.136 Although state 
law claims were historically reserved for and resolved by Article III courts, 
Justice O’Connor found that “there [was] no reason inherent in separation of 
powers principles to accord the state law character of a claim talismanic power 
in Article III inquiries.”137 Instead, a broad construction, “beyond form to the 
substance of what Congress has done,” suggested that the CFTC’s limited 
jurisdiction over a narrow class of ancillary common law claims was not a 
genuine threat to the separation of powers.138  
Third, the Court considered the motivations behind Congress’s departure 
from Article III requirements.139 Justice O’Connor recognized that Congress, 
when authorizing the CFTC to resolve counterclaims, did not intend to allocate 
or dilute jurisdiction among federal tribunals.140 Rather, the purpose was to 
provide a specific and limited federal regulatory scheme as an “inexpensive and 
expeditious” alternative.141 The Court determined that the reparations scheme in 
itself was certainly constitutional, and the ability to hear counterclaims was 
necessary to efficiently facilitate the process.142 In promotion of the ultimate 
goal, this allocation of authority to the CFTC was deemed to be, at worst, a de 
minimis intrusion.143  
 
 131 Id. at 851–52. 
 132 Id. 
 133 Id. at 852. 
 134 Id. at 851–52. 
 135 Id. at 853. 
 136 Id. 
 137 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 138 Id. at 854. 
 139 Id. at 851. 
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 141 Id. at 855. 
 142 Id. at 856. 
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By considering these three factors, the Court applied a broad construction of 
Article III, with heavy emphasis on the unique aspects of each congressional 
plan, and the practical effects in light of Article III safeguards.144 This time, the 
broad construction analysis in the Northern Pipeline dissent became the 
framework of the Schor majority opinion: “Bright line rules cannot effectively 
be employed to yield broad principles in all Article III inquires.” Nonetheless, 
this broad construction analysis would not last. 
3. Stern v. Marshall: Although Statutorily Authorized, a Bankruptcy Court 
Lacks the Constitutional Authority to Enter Final Judgment on 
Unresolved State Law Counterclaims in a Bankruptcy Proceeding 
Although strict construction of Article III in Northern Pipeline initially 
tightened the scope of bankruptcy court authority, subsequent use of broad 
construction shaped later Supreme Court holdings.145 The holdings in Schor and 
Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Products Company seemed to indicate a 
trend towards greater consideration of pragmatic efficiency and legislative 
intent.146  
In 2011, however, a 5-4 decision in Stern v. Marshall significantly limited 
bankruptcy court authority.147 Here, the Supreme Court held that although the 
bankruptcy court had statutory authority under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(C) to enter 
final judgment on core counterclaims unresolved in the process of ruling on a 
creditor’s proof of claim, the court ultimately lacked the constitutional authority 
to do so under Article III of the Constitution.148  
In Stern, celebrity Anna Nicole Smith (Smith), or legally Vickie Lynn 
Marshall, married J. Howard Marshall, an 89-year-old oil tycoon who died 
shortly after marriage.149 Before J. Howard Marshall’s death, his son, Pierce 
Marshall (Marshall), allegedly excluded Smith from her husband’s estate 
through fraud, so she sued Marshall in Texas probate court for tortious 
 
 144 Id. at 857. 
 145 Compare N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982), with Thomas v. 
Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 563 (1985), and Commodity Futures Trading Com. v. Schor, 478 
U.S. 833. 
 146 See generally Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 563; Commodity Futures Trading 
Com. v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833. 
 147 Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462 (2011). 
 148 Id. at 503. 
 149 Id. at 462. 
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interference.150 In response, Marshall filed a counterclaim alleging 
defamation.151 Before judgment in the Texas probate court, Smith filed for 
bankruptcy in a California bankruptcy court, and Marshall followed by filing a 
proof of claim for defamation damages to the bankruptcy court.152  
Smith again filed for tortious interference, but this time as a counterclaim in 
the bankruptcy case.153 The California bankruptcy court ultimately ruled in favor 
of Smith and awarded her damages.154 Marshall then appealed to the federal 
district court, claiming that because the tortious interference counterclaim was 
“non-core” to the bankruptcy proceeding, the bankruptcy court lacked 
jurisdiction.155 The Supreme Court subsequently granted certiorari.156 
Writing for the majority opinion, Chief Justice Roberts determined that 
bankruptcy courts lacked the jurisdiction to enter final judgment on state law 
counterclaims that were non-core to the bankruptcy proceeding.157 The Court 
reasoned that because they were not Article III courts, bankruptcy courts could 
not exercise “the judicial power of the United States” absent “limited 
circumstances.”158 Such “limited circumstances” consisted only of the three 
categories of exceptions laid out in Northern Pipeline: territorial courts, courts-
marital, and public-rights disputes.159 Chief Justice Roberts further indicated that 
while the bankruptcy courts’ exercise of judicial authority may prove efficient, 
practical effects alone were insufficient to overcome unconstitutionality and the 
strict separation of powers.160 The majority was not persuaded by any assertions 
that bankruptcy courts were mere adjuncts of the district courts.161  
Although broad construction advocates stressed the importance of “a single 
tribunal [having] broad authority to restructure [debtor-creditor] relations,” the 
 
 150 Kenneth N. Klee, Klee on Stern v. Marshall, 2011 LEXIS EMERGING ISSUES ANALYSIS 5743, at 1–2 
(June 2011). 
 151 Marshall v. Marshall (In re Marshall), 600 F.3d 1037, 1043 (9th Cir. 2010), aff’d sub. nom. Stern, 131 
S. Ct. 2594. 
 152 Id. at 1043–44. 
 153 Id. at 1043–45. 
 154 Marshall v. Marshall (In re Marshall), 253 B.R. 550, 554 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2000), adopted as modified, 
275 B.R. 5 (C.D. Cal. 2002), vacated and remanded, 392 F.3d 1118 (9th Cir. 2004), rev’d and remanded sub 
nom. Marshall v. Marshall, 547 U.S. 293 (2006), rev’d, 600 F.3d 1037 (9th Cir. 2010), aff’d sub nom. Stern, 131 
S. Ct. 2594. 
 155 Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462. 
 156 Id. 
 157 Id. 
 158 Id. at 499. 
 159 Id. at 500. 
 160 Id. at 506. 
 161 Id. at 488–89. 
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Stern majority remained unconvinced.162 Instead, Chief Justice Roberts 
minimized the importance of counterclaims being resolved in bankruptcy courts, 
maintaining that “the practical consequences of such limitations on the authority 
of bankruptcy courts to enter final judgments are [not] as significant . . . as the 
dissent suggest[s].”163 He indicated that the Code “already contemplates that 
certain state law matters in bankruptcy cases will be resolved by judges other 
than those of bankruptcy courts.”164 Specifically, under 28 U.S.C. § 1334(c)(2), 
bankruptcy courts were required to abstain from hearing non-core, state law 
claims capable of timely adjudication in a state forum with jurisdiction.165  
Accordingly, Chief Justice Roberts did not believe that the “removal of 
counterclaims . . . from core bankruptcy jurisdiction meaningfully change[d] the 
division of labor in the current statute.”166 He reasoned that as long as district 
courts rendered the final decisions, there would be no harmful consequences 
because bankruptcy judges could still hear counterclaims to propose findings of 
fact and conclusions of law.167 The Court also qualified the question presented 
and answered in Stern as a “narrow” one, believing that this strict construction 
of Article III would not prove detrimental to the bankruptcy process.168 
Writing for the dissent, Justice Breyer asserted that too much weight was 
placed on certain Article III precedent but not enough on others.169 In particular, 
he argued that the Court should have looked to more recent Article III precedent, 
such as Schor and Thomas, rather than placing a disproportionate amount of 
emphasis on an earlier Northern Pipeline decision.170 The dissent indicated that 
in both Schor and Thomas, there was a clear shift from “formalistic and 
unbending rules” to a more pragmatic and multifactor analysis.171 This analysis 
centered on whether “a challenged delegation of adjudicatory authority posed a 
genuine and serious threat that one branch of Government sought to aggrandize 
 
 162 Id. at 502. 
 163 Id. at 501. 
 164 Id. at 502. 
 165 28 U.S.C. § 1334(c)(2) (2012) (“Upon timely motion of a party in a proceeding based upon a State law 
claim or State law cause of action, related to a case under title 11 but not arising under title 11 or arising in a 
case under title 11, with respect to which an action could not have been commenced in a court of the United 
States absent jurisdiction under this section, the district court shall abstain from hearing such proceeding if an 
action is commenced, and can be timely adjudicated, in a State forum of appropriate jurisdiction.”). 
 166 Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. at 467. 
 167 Id. at 501–02. 
 168 Id. at, 503. 
 169 Id. at 506–07 (Breyer, J. dissenting). 
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 171 Id. at 513. 
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its own constitutionally delegated authority by encroaching upon a field of 
authority that the Constitution assigns exclusively to another branch.”172  
Accordingly, Justice Breyer gave greater deference to the broad Article III 
construction exhibited in the more recent Schor and Thomas decisions. In Schor, 
the Court determined that “the purposes underlying the requirements of Article 
III” were more important than “conclusory reference to the language.”173 The 
Schor holding demonstrated an unwillingness to simply “adopt formalistic and 
unbending rules.” 174 Further, in Thomas, the Court stated that “practical 
attention to substance rather than doctrinaire reliance on formal categories . . . 
inform[ed] application of Article III.”175 The Thomas holding demonstrated a 
reliance on “the nature of the right at issue and the concerns motivating the 
Legislature” when addressing the constitutional issues.176 In light of these 
holdings, the Stern dissent “conclude[d] that the delegation of adjudicatory 
authority [in Stern was] constitutional.”177  
Specifically, Justice Breyer gave five reasons why a “grant of authority to a 
bankruptcy court to adjudicate compulsory counterclaims [did] not violate any 
constitutional separation-of-powers principle related to Article III.”178 First, 
Smith’s tortious interference counterclaim “resemble[d] various common-law 
actions” often heard in bankruptcy courts.179 Because bankruptcy courts already 
heard claims of a similar nature to state law tort claims, there was only a nominal 
difference in hearing a tortious interference counterclaim.180  
Second, the exercise of judicial authority by bankruptcy courts favored 
constitutionality because these courts were “made up of judges who enjoy 
considerable protection from improper political influence.”181 These protections 
included: (1) federal court appointment of bankruptcy judges;182 (2) removal of 
bankruptcy judges by a circuit judicial council;183 (3) bankruptcy court salaries 
pegged to those of federal district court judges;184 and (4) courthouse costs and 
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 173 Commodity Futures Trading Com. v. Schor, 478 U.S. at 847. 
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other work-related expenses paid by the Judiciary.185 Essentially, these 
safeguards made bankruptcy judges similar to “magistrate judges, law clerks, 
and [the] Judiciary’s administrative officials who lack Article III tenure and 
compensation protections but do not endanger the independence of the Judicial 
Branch.”186  
Third, because “Article III judges control and supervise the bankruptcy 
court’s determinations,” bankruptcy court authority to hear the counterclaim did 
not really endanger judicial independence.187 After a ruling from a bankruptcy 
court, any party to the case had the option to “appeal those determinations to the 
federal district court, where the federal judge will review all determinations of 
fact for clear error and will review all determinations of law de novo.”188 
Additionally, Article III judges essentially “maintain[ed] greater control of 
bankruptcy court proceedings at issue here than they did over the relevant 
proceedings in any of the previous cases in which this Court has upheld a 
delegation of adjudicatory power.”189  
Fourth, the court’s judgment favored constitutionality because the parties 
consented to the bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction.190 Justice Breyer explained that 
“even when private rights are at issue, non-Article III adjudication may be 
appropriate when both parties consent.”191  
Fifth, the legislative purpose served by granting judicial authority to 
bankruptcy courts strongly favored constitutionality.192 The purpose of 
establishing federal bankruptcy courts was “to create a single tribunal that could 
efficiently restructure debtor-creditor relations.”193 As such, effective 
bankruptcy proceedings required an investment of broad authority to “decid[e] 
all matters in dispute . . . and decree[] complete relief.”194 Considering all five 
of these reasons, the Stern dissent concluded that “the magnitude of any 
intrusion on the Judicial Branch [could] only be termed de minimis,” and argued 
the statute was constitutional.195  
 
 185 Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. at 514–15 (Breyer, J. dissenting). 
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 191 N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 80 n.31 (1982). 
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 194 Id.; see also Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323, 335 (1966). 
 195 Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. at 517–19 (Breyer, J. dissenting). 
KIM_COMMENT GALLEYPROOFS 6/14/2018 3:43 PM 
2018] INSTABILITY OF BANKRUPTCY COURT AUTHORITY 581 
Despite these five objections, the decision in Stern significantly narrowed 
the scope of bankruptcy court authority.196 Stern halted the trend towards broad 
construction of Article III judicial authority and reinstituted a strict construction 
emphasizing formal boundaries over pragmatic consequences. However, it was 
not long before this formalistic approach to Article III once again took a backseat 
to procedural efficiency and bankruptcy goals.197 
4. Wellness International Network, Limited v. Sharif: Article III Authorizes 
Bankruptcy Courts to Adjudicate Noncore Claims in a Bankruptcy 
Proceeding with the Parties’ Voluntary and Knowing Consent 
The decision in Wellness International Network, Limited v. Sharif is another 
example of how strict and broad construction of Article III continually molds 
the scope of bankruptcy court authority. Although unable to directly address the 
Article III constitutional question, the Wellness majority applied a broad 
construction to sidestep the strict construction holding in Stern and to provide 
broader procedural relief through consent.  
In May 2015, less than four years after the Stern decision, broad construction 
of Article III again circumvented strict limitations to bankruptcy court 
jurisdiction.198 In Wellness, the Supreme Court addressed clarity and efficiency 
in bankruptcy procedure by broadening the scope of bankruptcy court authority. 
The Court held that, with the intentional and voluntary consent of both parties 
in a bankruptcy proceeding, bankruptcy courts could constitutionally exercise 
Article III authority to enter final judgments on non-core claims.199  
Here, respondent Richard Sharif filed for chapter 7 bankruptcy and listed 
petitioner Wellness International Network (“Wellness”) as a creditor. However, 
Wellness filed an adversary proceeding against Sharif, alleging that Sharif 
fraudulently transferred over five million dollars in assets to a trust administered 
on his mother’s behalf.200 Because Sharif failed to provide discovery in the 
proceedings, the bankruptcy court entered default judgment in favor of Wellness 
and designated the trust funds as part of Sharif’s property of the estate.201 Sharif 
subsequently appealed to the district court, claiming that the bankruptcy court 
was limited to proposing findings of facts and recommendations of law to the 
 
 196 See generally id. at 517–19. 
 197 See generally Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v Sharif, 135 S. Ct. 1932 (2015). 
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district court.202 Although the district court affirmed the bankruptcy court’s 
order, the case ultimately made it onto the Supreme Court’s docket.203 
Writing the majority opinion, Justice Sotomayor began by reinforcing the 
conclusion that Article III served as a structural protection against congressional 
attempts to transfer judicial authority to non-Article III courts “for the purpose 
of emasculating constitutional courts.”204 She also reiterated that Article III 
functioned to “[prevent] the encroachment or aggrandizement of one branch at 
the expense of the other.”205 Even so, the Court affirmatively concluded that 
“allowing Article I adjudicators to decide claims submitted to them by consent 
[did] not offend the separation of powers so long as Article III courts [retained] 
supervisory authority over the process.”206 The question now became whether 
allowing bankruptcy courts to decide non-core claims by consent would 
“impermissibly threaten the institutional integrity of the Judicial Branch.”207  
As emphasized previously by advocates of broad construction, the Court 
determined that this question “must be decided not by formalistic and unbending 
rules but an eye to the practical effect that the practice will have on the 
constitutionally assigned role of the federal judiciary.”208 Consequently, Justice 
Sotomayor applied a familiar framework of analysis, previously used in Schor 
and recently advocated in the Stern dissent, to conclude that “allowing 
bankruptcy litigants to waive the right to Article III adjudication of [non-core] 
claims does not usurp the constitutional prerogatives of Article III courts.”209 
Specifically, she considered that: (1) bankruptcy courts already often heard 
many related state law claims; (2) non-article III judges had sufficient safeguards 
from outside influence; (3) federal district courts had appellate review and 
supervisory roles in every bankruptcy proceeding; (4) party consent to 
bankruptcy court jurisdiction favored constitutionality; and (5) the nature of 
bankruptcy courts and legislative purpose for its authority also favored 
constitutionality.210 
Following a more pragmatic approach, the Court entertained an alternative 
where “Congress could choose to rest the full share of the Judiciary’s labor on 
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the shoulders of Article III judges,” but concluded that “doing so would require 
a substantial increase in the number of district judgeships.”211 Justice Sotomayor 
reasoned that “Congress [therefore] supplemented the capacity of district courts 
through the able assistance of bankruptcy judges.”212 Again, she reinforced that 
“[adjudication of non-core claims] poses no threat to the separation of powers” 
as long as bankruptcy judges were subject to Article III courts.213  
The Court also distinguished Wellness from the recent Stern case, and the 
even earlier Northern Pipeline case, because those holdings were premised on 
“the fact that the litigant did not truly consent to resolution of the claim against 
it in a non-Article III forum.”214 Justice Sotomayor explained that “interpreting 
Stern to bar consensual adjudications by bankruptcy courts would meaningfully 
change the division of labor in [the] judicial system.”215 Moreover, “adjudication 
based on litigant consent has been a consistent feature of the federal court system 
since its inception,” and therefore “[posed] no great threat to anyone’s 
birthrights, constitutional or otherwise.”216  
Finally, the Wellness majority relied on an implied consent standard and 
adopted it to the bankruptcy context.217 When applied to bankruptcy, this 
implied consent standard “possess[ed] the same pragmatic virtues—increasing 
judicial efficiency and checking gamesmanship—that [originally] motivated 
[the Court’s] adoption of [this standard] for consent-based adjudications by 
magistrate judges.”218 
In opposition, Chief Justice Roberts’s dissent applied a strict construction of 
Article III, asserting that “with narrow exceptions, Congress may not confer 
power to decide federal cases and controversies upon judges who do not comply 
with the structural safeguards of Article III.”219 The dissent, which closely 
mirrored the Stern majority’s rationale, opposed the Wellness majority’s 
opportunistic use of a sufficiently narrow case to address a much broader Article 
III constitutional question.220 In particular, while the immediate impact of the 
Wellness decision may have been limited, there was concern that such an 
 
 211 Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 135 S. Ct. at 1945. 
 212 Id. at 1946. 
 213 Id. 
 214 Id. 
 215 Id. at 1947. 
 216 Id. 
 217 Id. at 1948. 
 218 Id. 
 219 Id. at 1951 (Roberts, C.J. dissenting). 
 220 Id. at 1950. 
KIM_COMMENT GALLEYPROOFS 6/14/2018 3:43 PM 
584 EMORY BANKRUPTCY DEVELOPMENTS JOURNAL [Vol. 34 
authorization of encroachment onto the Judiciary would yield future “erosion of 
constitutional powers.”221  
Further, Chief Justice Roberts emphasized that preserving the separation of 
powers was one of the Court’s heaviest responsibilities, and in performing this 
duty, the Court has not hesitated to enforce the Constitution’s mandate “that one 
branch of Government may not intrude upon the central prerogatives of 
another.”222 He was also concerned about upholding the Framer’s intentions 
when forming the Constitution.223 The dissent relied on James Madison’s 
statement that “if there is a principle in our Constitution . . . more sacred than 
another, it is that which separates the Legislative, Executive, and Judicial 
powers.”224 
In addition, the Wellness dissent contended that bankruptcy court judges 
lacked the specific Article III protections of life tenure and secured salary that 
were required to render final judgments.225 Thus, exercising such judicial 
authority compromised Article III safeguards and was beyond constitutional 
scope.226 According to the dissent, Sharif did not have the authority to 
compromise the structural separation of powers, or agree to an exercise of 
judicial power outside Article III because separation of powers principles did 
not depend on whether the “encroached-upon branch approves the 
encroachment.”227 In particular, “the fact that Article III judges played a role in 
the Article III violation does not remedy the constitutional harm.”228  
As apparent in Wellness, while the societal need for bankruptcy law remains 
largely unchanged, the ever-changing composition of the Supreme Court 
continues to alter the Court’s propensity for strict or broad construction, which, 
in turn, continues to alter the scope of bankruptcy court authority.  
II. ANALYSIS 
Having examined the inconsistent history of bankruptcy precedent and the 
concerns of opposing constructions of Article III, this Comment suggests a 
balanced approach which accounts for several significant interests. When 
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inevitably redrawing the constitutional lines of bankruptcy court authority, the 
Court should extend sufficient consideration to the following four factors: (1) 
the current threat of encroachment, and the amount of protection necessary to 
prevent it; (2) the practical effects on bankruptcy proceedings, and the benefits 
of preserving bankruptcy law; (3) the residual consequences to existing non-
Article III tribunals; and (4) the current trend and disposition of bankruptcy 
authority. Lending appropriate weight to each factor will allow bankruptcy 
procedures to adapt to rapid societal growth within a constitutional framework, 
while increasing the predictability of bankruptcy law development.  
A. Factor One: The Current Potential for Encroachment Against the Current 
Preventive Safeguards 
When addressing violations of Article III judicial independence, the Court 
should determine whether the current structural protections are sufficient to 
address the dangers of encroachment. If existing safeguards adequately protect 
against potential infringements, then concerns regarding constitutional 
violations would be mitigated and more focus should be paid to the remaining 
factors. If, however, impending violations outweigh current protections, then 
structural interests should be the highest priority. To make this determination, 
the Court should first measure the immediate potential for encroachment, then 
independently assess what specific safeguards would be necessary to prevent 
such violations. Only then can the Court properly determine whether current 
safeguards sufficiently protect against infringements. 
1. Measuring the Immediate Potential for Encroachment 
To measure the immediate potential for encroachment, the Court should first 
look to the relevant provisions of Article III.229 In part, Section 1 states, “The 
judicial power of the United States, shall be vested in one Supreme Court, and 
in such inferior courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and 
establish.”230 Based on the language, there is no dispute in interpretation that 
judicial power is vested in Article III courts.231 However, the text of Section 1 
only articulates that judicial power is always vested in Article III courts—the 
text does not explicitly specify an unconditional limitation that judicial power 
must be exercised solely by Article III courts.232 This discrepancy is significant 
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because the face of the text allows for a different, conceivable interpretation: 
non-Article III tribunals may constitutionally exercise judicial authority in 
certain situations, provided that Article III courts always retain permanent and 
predominant judicial authority.233 
In fact, this interpretation directly correlates with one of the factors 
considered in the Wellness majority’s balancing test: the nature of the non-
Article III court.234 In Wellness, the specific nature of a non-Article III court 
carried substantial weight in determining the potential threat of encroachment 
onto judicial authority.235 In particular, the magnitude of probable danger was 
contingent on whether a non-Article III court siphoned judicial power at the 
expense of Article III courts.236 This deeper analysis into a non-Article III court’s 
exercise of judicial power inherently suggests that non-Article III exercise is not 
categorically unconstitutional, but that potential encroachment is instead 
measured on a spectrum governed by certain characteristics.  
One significant characteristic in determining the threat of non-Article III 
exercise of judicial authority can be inferred from the Wellness decision: an 
intent to subvert the Judiciary. It seems clear that non-Article III exercise of 
judicial authority is unconstitutional when the purpose is to bypass federal courts 
(e.g., a congressional act authorizing the exercise of judicial power with the 
intent to circumvent federal court jurisdiction). However, making such a 
determination is not as simple or clear when non-article III tribunals exercising 
limited judicial power were created for the primary purpose of assisting Article 
III courts. Again, the Court’s need for a deeper analysis into the unique 
circumstances of each case is evidence that the constitutionality of non-Article 
III exercise of judicial power is not always clear-cut.  
Following suit, there may be additional characteristics that substantially 
move the needle when determining the dangers of non-Article III judicial 
authority. Such characteristics may include the absence of Article III 
supervision, the absence of benefit to the non-Article III tribunal, and the breadth 
of judicial authority conferred. For example, if non-Article III courts functioned 
with the noblest of intentions, but exercised judicial power without the 
possibility of appellate review by district courts, it would still indicate a clear 
threat. If non-Article III tribunals exercised Article III authority to the benefit of 
no one other than the tribunal or Congress itself, it would also signal danger. If 
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a non-Article III court maintained broader Article III jurisdiction than the federal 
judicial courts themselves, it would constitute encroachment. However, if a non-
Article III court was subject to Article III appellate review, exercised judicial 
authority for the sole purpose of assisting Article III courts, and maintained very 
limited judicial authority, then this would suggest that there is no genuine, 
present threat to the Judicial Branch.  
Further, when defining the dangers to Article III structural safeguards, it is 
particularly important to study the Framers’ intentions. There is little doubt that 
the separation of powers must be handled with ample care; however, a far too 
narrow interpretation of the Framers’ intentions can stifle the process of 
determining the actual dangers.237 Aggrandizing the current dangers with 
theoretical risks undermines any practical solutions with an endless array of 
abstract hypotheticals. In fact, an interpretation that is too narrow can turn 
checks and balances into an impediment that deteriorates cooperation among 
each government branch and instead fosters complete isolation from one 
another.238 Supreme Court precedent indicates that a governmental framework 
of isolation is contrary to the Framers’ vision of the separation of powers.239 
Among other precedent, the Court established in Buckley v. Valeo that the 
Framers recognized a “hermetic sealing off of the three branches of Government 
from one another would preclude the establishment of a Nation capable of 
governing itself effectively.”240 Moreover, the Court, in Youngstown Sheet & 
Tube Company v. Sawyer, believed the Framers understood that “while the 
Constitution diffuses power the better to secure liberty, it also contemplates that 
practice will integrate the dispersed powers into a workable government. It 
enjoins upon its branches separateness but interdependence, autonomy but 
reciprocity.”241 Such precedent indicates that the Framers envisioned a system 
of checks and balances designed to both protect liberties and facilitate 
interdependence within each designated area.242 A far too narrow interpretation 
of the Framers’ intent, in contrast, can lead to a disproportionate fear of 
hypothetical dangers, to a point where necessary cautions become debilitating 
impediments to both the government and society.243  
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Finally, it is important to define an “encroachment” or “intrusion” when 
measuring the dangers to Article III jurisdiction. The Wellness dissent 
emphasized that the Court has not hesitated to enforce the Constitution’s 
mandate “that one branch of Government may not intrude upon the central 
prerogatives of another.”244 The key word here is “intrude.”245 The basic 
definition of “intrude” is “to thrust or bring in without invitation, permission, or 
welcome.”246 In the bankruptcy court context, it is misleading to say that 
Congress thrust itself into judicial authority without invitation, permission, or 
welcome. In fact, it was the district courts that initially referred bankruptcy cases 
to bankruptcy courts.247 Actual intrusion upon the central prerogatives of another 
branch would more properly be illustrated by a scenario in which Congress 
provided unsolicited assistance to the Judiciary through unhelpful non-article III 
tribunals, in spite of the Judiciary’s resistance. As such, necessary assistance 
should not be categorically equated with unsolicited intrusion, and this 
distinction alone may mitigate concerns regarding specific instances of 
“intrusion.”  
Similarly, the term “encroachment” has been used several times in Supreme 
Court precedent regarding bankruptcy authority.248 For example, the Wellness 
dissent asserted that the approval of the “encroached-upon” does not alleviate 
unconstitutional “encroachment.”249 However, what would the Framers consider 
an “encroachment?” The Court has previously documented “the genius of the 
Framers’ pragmatic vision . . . long recognized in cases that find constitutional 
room for necessary institutional innovation.”250 Referring to the Framers’ 
original separation of powers as a “pragmatic vision” suggests that practical 
effects were indeed important considerations to the Framers.251  
If pragmatic concerns were particularly significant, it seems probable that 
the Framers would not have considered a limited exercise of Article III authority 
by bankruptcy courts as an encroachment. If so, perhaps this Article III conflict 
is not truly about the potential dangers of encroachment or intrusion, but 
something else altogether. 
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2. Determining the Necessary Safeguards to Prevent Encroachment 
To determine the safeguards necessary to preserve the function of Article 
III, it is important to look at the relevant provisions. In part, Article III Section 
1 states, “The judges, both of the supreme and inferior courts, shall hold their 
offices during good behaviour, and shall, at stated times, receive for their 
services, a compensation, which shall not be diminished during their 
continuance in office.”252 A strict construction of this provision suggests that the 
only adequate safeguards are life tenure and protection from salary reduction.253 
However, a strict interpretation of Article III safeguards may not always result 
in the greatest protection. Moreover, there is a sufficient amount of broad 
construction precedent which supports different forms of protections that 
sufficiently preserve Article III objectives.  
Among others, the Stern majority and the Wellness dissent serve as 
examples. These two cases placed significant value in the protection provided to 
Article III judges: freedom from outside influence.254 Life tenure and fixed 
salary, however, are not necessarily the sole safeguards that provide such 
freedom. In fact, diminishing the power and competence of Article I bankruptcy 
judges because they lack certain safeguards can actually prove to be 
counterproductive. Limiting bankruptcy court authority does not automatically 
guarantee that the parties to the bankruptcy proceedings will find themselves 
under the authority of judges with life tenure and secured salary. Rather, a loss 
of faith in the efficacy, and an increase in uncertainty about the finality, of 
bankruptcy courts may even encourage people to avoid bankruptcy courts 
altogether and decide cases in state court, where judges also lack these same 
Article III safeguards. 
When following a strict construction of Article III protection, the plain 
reading logically suggests that state court judges lack even more safeguards from 
outside influence than bankruptcy court judges.255 This is because state court 
judges are often elected judicial candidates who serve limited terms.256 In the 
State of Georgia, superior and state court judges must be elected and re-elected 
on a nonpartisan basis for four-year terms.257 Due to the nature of such elections, 
it has become necessary for such judicial contenders to solicit not only campaign 
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contributions, but also public statements of support.258 In fact, candidates are 
encouraged to form committees to manage funds and obtain support.259  
It is contentious, to say the least, that elected state court judges, who at times 
must preside over the very electorate from whom they sought contribution or 
support, are incapable of rendering unbiased final adjudications with absolute 
integrity simply because they lacked a specific form of “freedom from outside 
influence.” State court judges are certainly capable of honorably and impartially 
entering final judgments, even though state courts do not have the specific 
safeguards required of federal courts under Article III.  
Consequently, the conclusion that bankruptcy court judges are not qualified 
to render final judgments, solely based on their lack of the specific safeguards 
listed in Article III, seems to be more of a theoretical, rather than realistic, 
assessment of the situation. Moreover, precedent indicates that there are 
fundamental conflicts between theoretical reasoning and practical reality. As 
indicated by the Stern dissent and Wellness majority, bankruptcy judges actually 
have numerous safeguards in place against “improper political influence.”260 
Among others, federal bankruptcy judges are appointed by the federal court of 
appeals;261 bankruptcy judges can be removed for cause by a circuit judicial 
council consisting of federal court of appeals and federal district court judges;262 
bankruptcy judges have salaries pegged to the salaries of federal district court 
judges;263 bankruptcy judges have courthouses and work-related expenses paid 
by the Judiciary itself.264 A formalistic interpretation of Article III overlooks all 
of the protections currently in place that insulate bankruptcy courts from external 
influence. 
Relying solely on a strict construction of Article III to narrowly identify two 
exclusive forms of protection favors categorization over function. By this 
reasoning, a hypothetical federal tribunal with even greater protections than 
those listed in Article III would not pass constitutional muster if its judges did 
not have both life tenure and secured salaries. An interpretation prioritizing form 
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over substance, particularly in the bankruptcy court context, does not guarantee 
safer results.  
3. Weighing Current Dangers against Current Safeguards 
After making the determinations in steps 1 and 2 above, the Court should 
weigh the potential dangers against the current protections. Presently, there seem 
to be sufficient safeguards surrounding bankruptcy court authority to overcome 
potential dangers.265 Bankruptcy courts seem to pose minimal threat because 
they are subject to appellate review, exercise limited Article III authority, and 
do so to efficiently provide relief, not to “emasculat[e] constitutional courts.”266 
Further, the current safeguards seem to sufficiently ensure freedom from outside 
influence because the federal judiciary maintains complete supervisory authority 
of bankruptcy procedures.267 The only true threat seems to be based on a 
“potential” derived from a formalistic reading of Article III. Consequently, the 
current balance seems to weigh in favor of constitutionality. 
B. Factor Two: Practical Effects on Bankruptcy Proceedings and the Benefits 
of Preserving Bankruptcy Law 
In today’s society, the changing scope of bankruptcy court authority can 
result in many practical consequences.268 A strict construction of Article III, 
however, adheres to formalistic textual interpretation with minimal 
consideration of practical effects. As evident in Stern, the Court was “not 
convinced that the practical consequences of such limitations on the authority of 
bankruptcy courts to enter final judgments are as significant as . . . the dissent 
suggests.”269 In the midst of conflicting views, the Court should make an 
objective assessment of the costs of limiting bankruptcy court authority by 
identifying the practical effects of bankruptcy proceedings and the benefits of 
preserving bankruptcy law. 
When determining the practical effects of bankruptcy proceedings, a natural 
starting point is to look at the court docket. The dissent in Stern drew attention 
to the sizable difference between the bankruptcy and federal dockets.270 It 
recognized a large discrepancy between the “staggering [volume]” of 
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bankruptcy cases of “almost 1.6 million” compared to the volume of federal 
district cases of “around 280,000 civil cases and 78,000 criminal cases.”271 It is 
important to remember that the bankruptcy court’s authority to decide all matters 
in bankruptcy proceedings is fundamental to procedural efficiency because state 
law claims and counterclaims frequently arise in bankruptcy.272 In reality, many 
compulsory counterclaims in bankruptcy cases “involve the same factual 
disputes as the claims that may be finally adjudicated by the bankruptcy 
courts.”273 If a bankruptcy court must regularly submit recommendations and 
wait for district court rulings before entering its own final judgments, it 
undoubtedly leads to “inefficiency, increased cost, delay, and needless 
additional suffering among those faced with bankruptcy.”274  
An empirical analysis of recent bankruptcy filings may prove helpful in 
ascertaining practical effects. According to statistical data, in 2015, there were 
349 authorized bankruptcy judgeships with only 330 active judges presiding 
over bankruptcy cases.275 However, there were 860,182 bankruptcy filings in 
2015, and 805,580 bankruptcy filings in 2016.276 This means there was an 
average annual caseload of about 2,441 to 2,600 cases per active bankruptcy 
judge.277 While some bankruptcy cases are likely to produce minimal 
adjudicatory work, there are other cases that contain over hundreds of adversary 
proceedings and contested issues.278 
In comparison, there were 1,015 active and senior district court judges279 
handling 387,687 filings in 2015.280 This means the average caseload for each 
district judge consists of about 381 cases.281 If bankruptcy cases were 
additionally distributed to each district judge in 2015, the caseload of each judge 
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would have increased from 381 cases to approximately 1229 cases—more than 
triple the caseload.282 Although this is an extrapolated statistical example of 
harmful practical consequences, it nevertheless shows that procedural concerns 
are significant factors when determining the effects on the efficiency of both 
bankruptcy and district court proceedings. Because bankruptcy precedent has 
consistently proven that bankruptcy law is subject to change, it is particularly 
important to focus on practical consequences when attempting to adjust to the 
large number of annual bankruptcy filings and pending cases.283 
Even without a tripled docket, increased delay will naturally follow a 
limiting of bankruptcy court authority. Bankruptcy courts were established for 
the very purpose of efficiently handling cases from the moment they are filed.284 
As such, a system and rules of procedure are in place to help facilitate the 
process. For example, a chapter 7 proceeding in a bankruptcy court will typically 
take about four to six months from the date the debtor files the petition to the 
granting of a discharge or going to trial.285 However, in 2015, it took a median 
of 27 months for civil cases in a district court to go to trial.286 
If a chapter 7 case involving non-core issues was presented to a bankruptcy 
court, it is not a stretch to deduce that it may take more than four times longer 
for debtors and creditors to receive final judgment because they must wait for 
pending resolution of ancillary issues. Civil trial scheduling may also be 
postponed in district courts where criminal cases are assigned higher priority 
than civil cases.287 In a bankruptcy court with no authority to adjudicate disputed 
state law claims, debtors will be stuck waiting for a separate federal district court 
proceeding before the resolution of their bankruptcy petition.  
As the Stern dissent warned, “to be effective, a [bankruptcy court] must have 
broad authority to restructure [debtor-creditor] relations.”288 Typical bankruptcy 
cases involve far more than a single debtor and single creditor. When there are 
a large number of creditors, delays become further exacerbated if a bankruptcy 
court cannot allocate resources before determining the legitimacy of each 
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claim.289 In a case involving a debtor and potentially thousands of creditors, 
everyone else gets less if one gets too much.  
While the current reality of bankruptcy proceedings may not warrant 
substantial reform, it seems undeniable that narrowing bankruptcy court 
authority will have significant practical consequences. In particular, when 
dealing with a debtor in severe financial distress, it is unfair to marginalize a 
debtor’s pragmatic concerns.  
C. Factor Three: The Residual Consequences to Existing Non-Article III 
Tribunals  
To accurately assess the impact of strict Article III interpretation to non-
Article III tribunals, the Court should analyze how precedent has dealt with 
similar non-Article III disputes. A pertinent example is the Court’s treatment of 
federal administrative agencies. In Schor, the Court dealt with the question of 
whether a congressional act authorized a specialized administrative agency to 
adjudicate state law counterclaims.290  
It is important to note that the Court’s reasoning behind the majority opinion 
in Schor essentially became the reasoning for the dissent in Stern.291 A 
comparative analysis of the Schor majority and the Stern dissent can help explain 
how the Court produced different holdings in these two cases. First, in both 
cases, the non-Article III tribunals were created by Congress.292 Here, the 
apparent distinction is that the bankruptcy court is a non-Article III court, while 
the CFTC is a non-Article III federal administrative agency. In Stern, a 
bankruptcy judge exercised judicial authority to determine related state law 
counterclaims.293 In Schor, an administrative law judge of the CFTC exercised 
judicial authority to determine ancillary state law counterclaims.294  
An initial, factual comparison of Stern and Schor highlights the similarities 
of both non-Article III tribunals. In fact, one might reasonably assume both 
tribunals would be subject to the same treatment. However, the holdings indicate 
that it is constitutional for Congress to authorize a federal administrative agency 
to exercise Article III judicial authority, but it is unconstitutional for Congress 
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to authorize the bankruptcy court to exercise the same. At first glance, the 
conflicting results which favor Article III constitutionality for federal agencies 
over Article I tribunals suggest that there must be some very fundamental 
differences between federal agencies and bankruptcy courts. A deeper look may 
prove enlightening.  
First, both the CFTC and bankruptcy courts are non-Article III tribunals.295 
For the CFTC, an administrative law judge is hired by the federal agency’s 
Office of Personnel Management through a merit selection process.296 
Administrative judges have career tenure and are subject to removal and salary 
reduction by the CFTC.297 In contrast, for bankruptcy courts, a bankruptcy judge 
is appointed by the federal court of appeals. 298 Bankruptcy judges serve for 
fourteen-year terms, are subject to removal by a circuit judicial council of federal 
court of appeals and district judges,299 and have salaries fixed to those of federal 
district court judges.300  
The results from these comparisons are somewhat confounding. It seems 
reasonable to conclude that a bankruptcy judge appointed by the federal district 
court has more Article III oversight than an administrative law judge appointed 
by a federal agency. However, the Court determined it was constitutional for the 
CFTC administrative law judge to exercise judicial authority, but held it was 
unconstitutional for a bankruptcy judge to exercise the same authority.301 If 
Article III oversight does not account for these different results, then perhaps the 
distinction is rooted in the Congressional motivations behind the allocation of 
authority. Again, a deeper analysis is necessary. 
The CFTC was created to prevent fraudulent futures and options 
transactions, and judicial authority was necessary to hear related state law 
counterclaims for efficient regulation of the futures contract market.302 In 
contrast, the bankruptcy courts were created to provide the insolvent debtor with 
a fresh start and unpaid creditors with equal repayment.303 Judicial authority to 
hear related state law counterclaims was necessary for the efficient facilitation 
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of such relief and repayment.304 Still, precedent reveals that the CFTC can 
exercise Article III authority, but the bankruptcy court cannot.305 This 
conclusion is disconcerting because it indicates that the efficient and cost-
effective regulation of a commodity in the futures contract market is more 
important than the efficient and cost-effective facilitation of bankruptcy relief to 
debtors and creditors. While both functions may benefit substantially from 
efficient adjudication, it seems at least equally important to address a debtor in 
overwhelming debt as a consumer in the commodity futures contract market.  
In fact, this inconsistency raises additional questions. Did Congress 
unconstitutionally authorized non-Article III federal administrative agencies 
with judicial authority to hear related state law claims? Or rather, did Congress 
constitutionally confer non-Article III bankruptcy courts with judicial authority 
in 1978—despite how the Court has interpreted it? In the larger scheme, if 
federal administrative agencies were unconstitutionally authorized to exercise 
judicial power, are the three narrow exceptions—territorial courts, courts-
martial, and public rights disputes—just examples of more “hypothetical 
slippery slope[s]”306 that will threaten Article III separation of powers in the 
future? If constitutionality is truly determined through a strict interpretation of 
Article III, then there should be no room for inconsistent allocations or 
exceptions. 
In an attempt to answer these questions, it is helpful to examine the 
arguments regarding Congress’s authority to confer judicial authority on non-
Article III tribunals. In particular, the Wellness dissent, which stressed the grave 
implications of allowing parties to consent to constitutional violations, seems 
subject to two opposing interpretations.307 In one interpretation, the dissent 
implies that Congress may authorize non-Article III judges to decide federal 
cases as long as they are officially categorized as an accepted federal agency or 
one of the three Northern Pipeline exceptions.308 In the other interpretation, the 
dissent implies that Congress may never authorize non-Article III judges to enter 
final judgment in federal cases. Either way, both interpretations yield 
implications that are inconsistent with precedent or the currently accepted 
practices of society.309 If the constitutional separation of powers requires a bright 
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line boundary, then what accounts for the different treatment of federal agencies 
and bankruptcy courts in exercising Article III authority?  
One possible answer is that the distinction is not actually rooted in a 
substantive threat to the separation of powers. Rather, it is a distinction born of 
an earlier Court favoring broad construction of Article III and a later Court 
favoring strict construction. This seems particularly evident when strict 
interpretation concerns about Article III structural safeguards are mostly 
dependent on classification and categorization, rather than function or intention. 
If so, the constitutional inquiry of Article III authority is far too contingent on 
technical wording and not dependent enough on function. 
The other potential answer is that Congress never had authority to confer 
Article III authority on any non-Article III judge. This would indicate, however, 
that it is unconstitutional for any administrative agencies, including the CFTC, 
to exercise judicial authority. In fact, even the three narrow exceptions could be 
considered violations because, regardless of classification, Congress never had 
the authority to confer judicial power on any non-Article III tribunal. The 
Wellness dissent expressed that “the fact that Article III judges played a role in 
the Article III violation does not remedy the constitutional harm.”310 Following 
this logic, does this consequently mean that the Supreme Court also played a 
role in Article III violations when it allowed any non-Article III tribunal to 
exercise judicial authority? According to the Wellness dissent, the answer may 
be yes, if the power to enter final judgment is reserved solely for the Judiciary, 
regardless of tradition or practicality of use.311  
The inconsistent treatment of Article III authority, especially when 
comparing Schor and Stern, is problematic. The Court may one day have to 
address these discrepancies, but it must then be prepared to account for the 
residual implications of its decision. If the Court adheres to the strict 
construction of Article III, then is the Court acknowledging that it plays a 
continual role in Article III violations through allocating authority to 
administrative agencies and excepted tribunals, or is the Court recognizing the 
unconstitutionality of institutional practices that have lasted for decades? 
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D. Factor Four: Current Trend and Future Outlook of Bankruptcy Law: The 
Stern Amendments 
Since the ruling of Stern, and in response to shifting precedent from Stern to 
Wellness, the Judicial Conference of the United States proposed amendments to 
the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedures on April 28, 2016.312 When 
determining the future scope of bankruptcy court authority, the Court should 
lend greater deference to the recent trend of bankruptcy law, rather than selecting 
precedent that most resonates with their canon of constitutional construction. By 
respecting the current movement of bankruptcy law over a predisposition to a 
particular interpretation, there will be more clarity to the future outlook of 
bankruptcy law, and consequently, more predictability and greater ability to 
prepare for future adjustments. The Stern amendments are an illustration of one 
of the most recent developments in bankruptcy law.  
The Stern amendments addressed Rules 7008, 7012, 7016, 9027, and 9033 
of the Rules of Bankruptcy Procedures, which finally went into effect on 
December 1, 2016.313 These amendments, proposed in response to Stern, 
focused on three key changes: “(1) to eliminate the distinction between “core” 
and “non-core” proceedings in the Bankruptcy Rules; (2) to require parties to 
explicitly state from the beginning whether they consented to entry of final 
judgment by a bankruptcy judge in all adversary proceedings; and (3) to direct 
the bankruptcy courts to determine the proper treatment of all proceedings.”314 
When determining the trend of bankruptcy court authority, it is important to 
understand the reasoning and purpose behind these amendments.  
In 2011, the Advisory Committee on Bankruptcy Rules had already 
considered amendments to the Bankruptcy Rules in response to the Stern 
ruling.315 One substantial post-Stern issue was that the terms ‘core’ and ‘non-
core’ were full of ambiguity.316 To make matters worse, even if a proceeding 
was designated as statutorily core, there was a possibility that the bankruptcy 
judge was not constitutionally authorized to determine the case, rendering the 
proceeding constitutionally non-core.317 Without a definitive answer from the 
Court, this continued to be a problem. For example, the existing Rules 7008318 
 
 312 H.R. DOC. NO. 114-130, at 34 (2016).  
 313 Id. 
 314 Id. at 54–55. 
 315 Id. at 52. 
 316 Id. at 52. 
 317 Id. 
 318 FED. R. BANKR. P. 7008(a). 
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and 7012319 required that parties to adversary bankruptcy proceedings state in 
the complaint and pleading whether the proceeding was core or non-core.320 For 
non-core proceedings, a determination had to be made whether the pleader 
consented to entry of final judgment by a bankruptcy judge.321 Under Rule 
7012(b), final judgements could not be entered “except with the consent of the 
parties.”322  
When the constitutional validity of consent was finally upheld in the Court’s 
subsequent Wellness decision, the Committee “voted unanimously to proceed 
with the Stern amendments as originally drafted and approved, rather than 
propose a set of amendments that would take a different approach to expressing 
party consent to the bankruptcy court adjudication.”323 These amendments 
provided for express consent from all parties to a bankruptcy court proceeding 
so that, absent consent, it would not be necessary for another court to determine 
whether bankruptcy courts had the authority to hear and determine disputes.324  
Further, the Committee decided to go beyond the minimum implied consent 
standard in Wellness, even though it recognized a small possibility that “an 
express consent approach could result in more non-core and Stern claims being 
adjudicated in the district court.”325 The reasoning was because an “express 
consent approach [had] the advantage . . . of clarity.”326 Express consent would 
eliminate any uncertainty regarding party consent because a court could simply 
look to the pleadings and clearly determine whether parties explicitly 
consented.327 Today, these amendments reflect an adherence to the development 
of procedural efficiency by adding clarity to bankruptcy procedure. 
The Committee also determined that it became unnecessary to determine 
whether a pleading was core or non-core because even a statutorily core issue 
did not necessarily establish constitutional authority of non-article III 
bankruptcy courts to adjudicate the issue. Thus, the Stern amendments to Rules 
7008 and 7012 were designed to require parties in every proceeding to explicitly 
state their consent or non-consent to a bankruptcy judge’s entry of final 
 
 319 Id. 7012(b). 
 320 H.R. DOC. NO. 114-130, at 52 (2016). 
 321 Id. 
 322 Id. 
 323 Id. at 54. 
 324 Id. 
 325 Id. 
 326 Id. 
 327 Id. 
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judgment, without distinction of core versus non-core.328 Similar amendments 
were proposed to Rule 9027(a) and (e) involving removal.329 Removal actions 
were amended to no longer distinguish between core or non-core, and instead 
require a clear statement that the parties either consent or do not consent to final 
judgment by a bankruptcy judge.330 By removing the distinction between core 
or non-core, there should be less uncertainty about whether bankruptcy 
judgments are truly final and the assurance that, regardless of the issues, final 
judgment can be entered with party consent.  
Finally, the Committee “believe[d] it [was] important to provide needed 
clarity to the bankruptcy community as soon as possible regarding how 
bankruptcy courts can proceed on a consent basis to adjudicate Stern claims.”331 
As such, important amendments were also proposed to Rule 7016 involving pre-
trial procedures.332 These changes were designed to provide the bankruptcy 
court with three options on how to exercise its authority in proceedings: (1) to 
hear and determine the dispute, (2) to hear the dispute and issue findings of fact 
and conclusions of law for the district court, or (3) to take some other action, 
allowing for variation based on different scenarios the court might encounter.333 
The final amendment was to Rule 9033, which governs subsequent procedures 
once a bankruptcy court issues proposed findings of fact and conclusions of 
law.334 Once strictly limited to non-core proceedings, this change expanded 
jurisdiction to any proceeding in which the bankruptcy court has issued proposed 
findings of fact and conclusions of law.  
The Stern Amendments are signs of a current trend shifting from a strict 
construction of formalistic and textual interpretations, to a broad construction of 
the pragmatic effects to bankruptcy law efficiency. These amendments alleviate 
some pragmatic concerns because they allow bankruptcy courts to definitively 
adjudicate non-core proceedings with the parties’ consent and provide 
procedural guidelines on how best to handle proceedings when lacking consent.  
 
 328 Id.at 52. 
 329 Id. at 54. 
 330 The Committee Notes on Rules—2016 Amendment provide in part: “Subdivisions (a)(1) and (e)(3) are 
amended to delete the requirement for a statement that the proceeding is core or non-core and to require in all 
removed actions a statement that the party does or does not consent to the entry of final orders or judgment by 
the bankruptcy court.” Id. at 46. 
 331 Id. at 56. 
 332 Id. at 52. 
 333 The Committee Notes on Rules—2016 Amendment provides in part: “This rule is amended to create a 
new subdivision (b) that provides for the bankruptcy court to enter final orders and judgment, issue proposed 
findings and conclusions, or take some other action in a proceeding.” Id. at 42.  
 334 FED. R. BANKR. P. 9033. 
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However, while these amendments have mitigated several procedural 
uncertainties in bankruptcy proceedings, history shows that the Court can 
drastically alter the scope of bankruptcy court authority through strict or broad 
construction at any time. The Court has yet to provide a sufficiently clear or 
indisputable answer to the deeper constitutional question of Article III authority.  
CONCLUSION 
Presently, the current outlook for bankruptcy procedure seems to be trending 
towards appropriating weight to the pragmatic need for bankruptcy courts to 
wield judicial authority. However, this current trend is the result of a Wellness 
Court that favored broad construction, as opposed to the previous Stern Court 
which adhered to strict construction. Thus, it is likely that facilitation of 
bankruptcy goals will continue to be contingent on whether the Court 
implements a strict or broad construction to future cases and controversies. For 
the sake of consistency and predictability, the Court should lend greater 
deference to the current trend of bankruptcy law when determining bankruptcy 
court authority. If not, it is only a matter of time before bankruptcy law will 
again be unpredictably altered by the opposing constructions of Article III text, 
and the outcome will be unclear.  
This Comment is not an imposition, but an attempt to reconcile the 
drastically shifting landscape of bankruptcy court authority. The lack of clarity 
resulting from the unstable scope of bankruptcy court authority erodes the 
fundamental purpose of bankruptcy to provide quick and efficient debtor relief 
and creditor repayment. Instead, too much time and resources are spent 
addressing ancillary jurisdictional issues which lead to increased cost, delay, and 
inefficiency. A balanced methodology, which weighs both the positive and 
negative realities of bankruptcy law and governmental framework, serves as a 
suggestion to provide more consistency and predictability in bankruptcy law 
development.  
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A priority in the future development of bankruptcy law should be to take 
incremental steps from the unstable to the stable. All those involved in 
bankruptcy—courts, judges, litigants, and society—stand to benefit from a little 
more stability.  
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